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Articles
Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes
to California: Questions in the Wake
of Elam v. College Park Hospital
GARY F. LOVERIDGE*
BETSY S. KIMBALL**
Five years ago, a student commentator writing in this Law Journal'
assessed the prospects for the coming of hospital "corporate negli-
gence"2 in California and concluded that the prospects seemed excel-
lent. The prospects were indeed excellent for, in May of 1982, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal decided the case of Elam v. College
* A.B. 1965, Standford Univ.; J.D. 1972, Univ. of California at Davis. Shareholder, Mc-
Donough, Holland & Allen, A Professional Corporation. Member, State Bar of California.
** A.B. 1972, Univ. of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1975, Univ. of San Francisco. Associate,
McDonough, Holland & Allen, A Professional Corporation. Member, State Bars of California
and Alabama.
I. Comment, The Hospital's Responsibilityfor its Medical Staff. Prospects/or Corporate Neg-
ligence in Caif/ornia, 8 PAC. U. 141 (1977).
2. The terms "corporate negligence" and "corporate liability" are used interchangeably by
many courts and commentators. In the interest of uniformity, the term "corporate negligence"
will usually be used in this article. "Corporate negligence" apparently stems from an effort to
limit the application of charitable immunity by distinguishing between corporate negligence by
employment of incompetent servants and corporate liability imposed as a result of respondeat
superior. See Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs to Regulate the Quality
ofPatient Care: .4 LegalPerspective, 14 PAC. L.J. 55, 56, n.3 (1982); see also Elam v. College Park
Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 338 n.5, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 159 (1982).
3. Comment, supra note 1, at 163.
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Park Hospital,4 defining and applying the doctrine of corporate negli-
gence for the first time on the appellate level in California.5
In Elam, the Court of Appeal was confronted with the following situ-
ation. Sophia Elam had filed a medical malpractice action against a
podiatrist, a physician and College Park Hospital. She complained that
the podiatrist had negligently performed podiatric surgery on her at
College Park Hospital.6 The podiatrist was neither an agent nor an
employee of the hospital.7 Elam herself had selected him for podiatric
treatment.8 The podiatrist had been granted podiatric surgical privi-
leges by the governing board of the hospital.9
Elam asserted that the hospital had a duty to her to ensure the com-
petence of the members of its medical staff.'0 The hospital argued that
it had no such duty." The trial court agreed with the hospital and
granted its motion for summary judgment.'2
The Court of Appeal reversed. It reviewed case precedent,' 3 which it
summarized as establishing that a hospital has a duty to protect pa-
tients from harm,' 4 and then concluded as follows:
We can perceive of no reason why this established duty of care does
not encompass the duty asserted by Elam; for, as a general principle,
a hospital's failure to insure the competence of its medical staff
through careful selection and review creates an unreasonable risk of
harm to its patients.' 5
The Elam decision leaves in its wake a number of very interesting
questions for plaintiffs' lawyers and for hospital and physicians' attor-
4. 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, modfled, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a (1982).
5. In 1973, the Superior Court of Sacramento County imposed corporate liability on a hos-
pital for retention of a physician on its medical staff in the case of Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No.
228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1973), rev'd forfailure to grant jury trial, 60
Cal. App. 3d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and remanded 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978); see also, Eng v. Valley Memorial Hosp., Civ. No. 46 0898-3 (Super. Ct.
Alameda County, Cal. Dec. 15, 1977), cited in Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate I1osi-
tal Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 383, 386, n.16 (1980), reprinted in SPECIALTY LAW DI EsT:
HEALTH CARE 5 (August 1981).
6. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 336, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
7. Id. at 336, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 337, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
11. Id. at 338, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
12. Id. at 335, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
13. Rice v. California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal. 2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945); Guilliams v.
Hollywood Hosp., 18 Cal. 2d 97, 114 P.2d 1 (1941); Murillo v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 99 Cal.
App. 3d 50, 160 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1979); Valentin v. La. Societe Francaise, 76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172
P.2d 359 (1946).
14. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
15. Id. at 341, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161. The opinion originally published in the Official Ad-
vance Sheets imposes a duty of "careful selection, review and supervision." Id. at 341, 183 Cal.
Rptr. at 161. The opinion was subsequently modified by removal of the duty of supervision. 133
Cal. App. 3d 94a.
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neys alike. They break down into several categories, two of which can
be loosely labeled as the "parties questions" and the "proof questions."
The "parties questions" concern the possibility of additional defen-
dants or even cross-defendants in corporate negligence cases. Are med-
ical staff members who serve on peer review or quality assurance
committees potential defendants or cross-defendants in a corporate
negligence case? Are the committees themselves or are medical staffs
per se potential parties? Are hospital governing bodies or individual
directors or trustees likewise subject to suit? The "proof questions"
concern how the plaintiff can prove his or her case against a hospital
and how the hospital can defend. Are medical staff committee pro-
ceedings and records discoverable and/or admissible? Can the plaintiff
use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove his or her case? The pur-
pose of this article is to articulate and examine a number of the ques-
tions raised by Elam, 16 and even to answer a few.
BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of the Contemporary Hospital
A basic understanding of the administration and organization of hos-
pitals in the 1980's is very important for an appreciaton of the questions
raised by Elam, because the case applies traditional principles of corpo-
rate and tort law to an institution that is so highly regulated that it
cannot operate like an ordinary corporation.
In the beginning, doctors were the hospital; they often founded,
owned and ran the hospitals.17 Today, by contrast, health care is truly
big business.' 8 The hospital has been transformed from merely the
"doctors' workshop"' 9 to a multi-faceted health center with the respon-
16. One question which will not be addressed in this article is just exactly what the duty
entails. That question has been well covered elsewhere, although not with respect to California
law. See Comment, Hospital Corporation Liability: An Effective Solution to Controlling Private
Physician Incompetence? 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 342, 360-61 (1979). Perhaps the most onerous
definition of a hospital's duty yet imposed is in a case decided after the foregoing comment was
published. In Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269
N.E.2d 621 (1980), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a hospital could breach its duty
by failing to monitor and oversee the keeping of patient progress notes. The case is discussed in a
case note, Corporate Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Monitor and Oversee Medical Treat-
ment - Bost v. Riley, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 309 (1981). The North Carolina appellate courts
have been reluctant to apply the duty to supervise. See, e.g., Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.E.2d 392
(N.C. App. 1981); Jones v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 286 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. App. 1982).
17. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 New ENO. J. MED. 963 (1980).
18. During calendar year 1980, $247 billion was spent on health care in the United States.
That represents 9.4 percent of the gross national product for that year. $100 billion (40.5 percent
of the expenditure) was spent on hospital care. CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSoCIATION, HOSPITAL
FACT BOOK 1981-2. There is considerable debate over how health care should be provided. Cf.
Relman, supra note 17; Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1416 (1980).
19. Relman, supra note 17; Comment, supra note 16.
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sibility for arranging, coordinating and providing comprehensive
health care.20 With this metamorphosis has come regulation, both
from within the health care industry and by the government. The prin-
cipal source of private regulation is the Joint Commission on Accredi-
tation of Hospitals (hereinafter referred to as JCAH) t One might
even say that the modem hospital organization is a direct descendant of
the model developed initially in the early 1900's by the American Col-
lege of Surgeons, the forerunner of the JCAH. Recognizing the need to
develop standards for American hospitals, the American College of
Surgeons inaugurated a program for hospital standardization in 1918
called, not surprisingly, the "Program for Hospital Standardization."22
Over the years, the College developed minimum standards for hospitals
which included a medical staff organization responsible for the supervi-
sion and control of professional work, conferences for the review and
analysis of clinical work at regular intervals, accurate and complete
medical records with sufficient data to justify the diagnosis and warrant
the treatment, clinical laboratory and X-ray facilities for the determina-
tion and confirmation of the diagnosis, and elimination of fee-splitting,
20. See, e.g., Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 344, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163; Southwick, The Hospitalas
an sftiltution - Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relalonship with the Staff Physician, 9
CALIF. W.L. REV. 429 (1973). The demise of the hospital as the "doctors' workshop" is well
illustrated by considering an exerpt from a 1961 American Hospital Association publication enti-
tled HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION REFERENCES [hereinafter referred to as 1961 ACCREDITATION
REFERENCES]. The subject of trustees and the hospital administrator's presence at medical staff
meetings was discussed as follows:
Trustees should not regularly attend medical staff meetings. A medical staffimeeting is
predominantly on medical subjects. If it would be deemed wise for a trustee to present
some subject to the medical staff, he should be granted the privilege and amenities of
presentation early and then excuse himself.
The business portion of medical staff meetings should be attended by the administra-
tor as the official representative of, and the liaison officer for, the board with the medical
staff. Attendance at the professional portion of the meeting should be a matter ofjudg-
ment and optional. One lay administrator put it this way: "I attend all the general
medical staff meetings. I love it and so does my staff. It is a wonderful chance to talk to
them personally and greet them. I make sure the meeting room is clean, orderly and
ready. I run the projector. I help take attendance. I make sure the coffee and snacks are
ready after the meeting, answer the telephone and deliver messages to the doctors. I help
wherever I can."
Id. at 96.
Today, it is still true that trustees tend to be businessmen and civic leaders who are often unfa-
miliar with medical matters. See, e.g., Porter, .4 Profile ofa Hospital Trustee, TRUSTEE 21 (Jan.
1975); R. CUNNINGHAM, GOVERNING HOSPITALS -TRUSTEES AND THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITIES
35 (1976). Certainly trustees are no longer proverbial children in their father's den, who may be
allowed to speak, but then should excuse themselves and let the adults continue their business.
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine the present-day hospital administrator who has spent two years
in graduate school obtaining an MHA or an MBA degree and years becoming a fellow in the
American College of Hospital Administrators, who "loves" making sure the doctors' "coffee and
snacks are ready" and "answer[ing] the telephone and deliver[ing] the messages to the doctors."
Id.
21. Hereinafter referred to as the JCAH.
22. 1961 ACCREDITATION REFERENCES, supra note 20, at vii.
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which was then a wide-spread practice.23 The American College of
Surgeons continued to administer the standardization program until
1952, when the JCAH was formed.24
B. Hospital Regulation in the 1980's
1. The JCAH
The JCAH proved to be a worthy successor to the American College
of Surgeons as administrator of the hospital standardization program,
for, today, being accredited by the JCAH is nearly as important as be-
ing licensed. For example, hospitals accredited by the JCAH are auto-
matically deemed to meet the federal Medicare conditions for
participation for hospitals and, as a result, are qualified to participate
in the Medicare program.2
The JCAH publishes extensive standards in each annual Accredita-
tion Manual for Hospitals, among which are standards for the hospital
governing body26 and for the hospital medical staff.27 The JCAH stan-
dards (and the Medicare Conditions of Participation) require the gov-
erning body of the hospital to delegate to the medical staff the authority
to evaluate the professional competence of staff members and applica-
tions for clinical privileges.28 The medical staff is to have the overall
responsibility for the quality of all medical care provided to patients, 29
but it is also accountable to the governing body for the performance of
the duties and responsibilities assigned to it.30
2 State Law/Administrative Regulations
In 1965, California law was amended to require hospital governing
bodies to adopt rules providing for the formal organization of medical
staffs.3 Medical staffs are to be "self-governing with respect to the pro-
fessional work performed in the hospital." 32 Interestingly, this require-
ment was not contained in the licensing laws regulating hospitals, but
23. Id.; see also Bowman, Hospital Standardization Series: General Hospitals of 100 or More
Beds, 4 BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 3 (1919).
24. 1961 ACCREDITATION REFERENCES, supra note 20, at vii. The need for such standards
was definitely there. During the program's first year, only 12.9 percent of the hospitals surveyed
met the minimum criteria. Id.
25. 42 U.S.C. §1395(bb)(a)(1) (1982). JCAH accreditation is also required for reimbursement
by many private insurance carriers and for accreditation of physician post-graduate training pro-
grams for board eligibility.
26. JCAH, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 51-56 (1982) [hereinafter referred to
as 1982 ACCREDITATION MANUAL].
27. Id. at 93-109.
28. Id. at 55-56; 42 C.F.R. §§405.1001-405.1040 (1980).
29. 1982 ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 93.
30. Id.
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2282(c).
32. Id.
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rather in the licensing laws which regulated physicians. The new law
provided that it is unprofessional conduct for a licensed physician to
'practice in a hospital which did not have rules established by the gov-
erning body, including a provision for a self-governing medical staff.33
The first mention of medical staffs in California statutes regulating hos-
pitals occurred in 1973, when Health and Safety Code section 1250 was
amended to include a reference to medical staffs.34 The California Ad-
ministrative Code was also amended to incorporate the American Col-
lege of Surgeons/JCAH model into the hospital licensing regulations,
which now provide that "(e)ach hospital shall have an organized medi-
cal staff responsible to the governing body for the fitness, adequacy and
quality of the medical care rendered to patients in the hospital. ' 35 Just
as under the JCAH regulatory scheme, pursuant to California law, the
governing body of the hospital has the overall responsibility for the
professional care rendered in the hospital, despite the fact that it is re-
quired to delegate the quality assurance function to the medical staff.36
3. Organization of Medical Staff
The exact organization of a hospital medical staff may vary depend-
ing largely upon the type and size of the hospital.37 Generally speak-
ing, however, the medical staff is organized by departments or major
clinical services38 and by committees. The departments are denomi-
nated by specialty, for example, medicine, surgery, pathology, and ra-
diology. The committees transcend substantive specialty and relate to
administrative functions within the hospital. The only committee re-
quired by the JCAH is the executive committee. 39 It is charged with
accounting to the governing body for the quality assurance function
delegated to the medical staff by the governing body.40 Under the
JCAH regulatory scheme, the remaining committee structure is un-
prescribed and, thus, is left to individual medical staffs to delineate in
their bylaws;41 but medical staff bylaws must be approved by the gov-
erning body.42
33. Id.
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1250(a).
35. 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §70703(a)(l)(F).
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1250(a).
37. 1982 ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 95.
38. Id. at 102.
39. Id.
40. Id. The peer review process is discussed in Comment, MedicalPeer Review Protection, 52
TEMPLE L. REV. 552 (1979).
41. See, Copeland, Hospital Responsibilityfor Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members:
'"4m I my Brother's Keeper?", 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 27, 47 (1978). Copeland is an attorney and a
hospital administrator. His article contains a particularly thorough examination of hospital and
medical staff organization.
42. 1982 ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 103-04.
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California licensing regulations for hospitals are more specific. In
addition to an executive committee, they require the medical staff to
have the following committees: credentials, medical records, pharmacy
and therapeutics, tissue, utilization review and infections.43 Just as
under the JCAH scheme, the hospital licensing regulations require the
executive committee to act as a liason between the governing body and
the other medical staff committees.44
B. Corporate Negligence
The doctrine of hospital corporate negligence has been widely ex-
amined. "[A] small library of legal comment' 45 on the subject has in-
deed been produced.46
To date, the courts in many states have recognized or implemented
corporate negligence in one context or another.47 In Elam, the court
held that a hospital could be liable for breach of the duty to "insure the
competence of its medical staff through careful selection and review."
48
Just what that duty entails, or might entail, is beyond the scope of this
43. 22 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §70703(e). In small hospitals, however, the various committee
functions may be performed by a committee of the whole. Id.
44. Id.
45. Goldberg, supra note 2.
46. In addition to Judge Goldberg's own contribution to the library, among the more recent
legal comments are the following: Southwick, supra note 20; Slawkowski, Do the Courts Under-
stand/he Realities of HospitalPractices?, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 452 (1978); Copeland, supra note 41;
Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a HospitalAs an Institution: Are the Walls of Jericho Tumbling?, 16
FORUM 225 (1980); Lisko, Hospital Liability Under Theories of Respondant Superior and Corporate
Negligence, 47 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 171 (1978); Ludlam, The Impact of the Darling Decision upon the
Practice of Medicine and Hospitals, 11 FORUM 756 (1976); Payne, Recent Developments Affecting aHospital's Liability for Negligence of Physicians, 18 S. TF_. L.J. 389 (1977); Zaslow, Vicarious
Liability of a Hospitalfor Tortious Acts o its Independent Contractors Delivering Medical Care, 49
PENN. B.A.Q. 466 (1978); Strodel, The Impaired Physician - Hospital Corporate Liability, 24
TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 488 (198 1); Comment, supra note 16; Comment, supra note 1; Comment,
The Hospital-Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians, 50
WASH. L. REv. 385 (1975); Casenote, supra note 16; Notes, Wisconsin HospitalHeldto Owe a Duty
to its Patients to Select Qualifled Physicians, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 139 (1981); Comment, Hospital
May Be Held Liable for Permitting Incompetent Independent Physician to Operate, 8 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 177 (1976).
47. See Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976); Elam v.
College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, modfied, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a
(1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo. App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977); Mitchell County Hosp. Authority
v. Joiner, 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d 307 (1971), aff'd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 Ill. App. 253, 200 N.E.2d 149 (1964), aj'd, 33 Iln.
2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich.
App. 685, 236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v.
Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Moore v. Carson-Tahoe
Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 495 P.2d 605 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super. 302,
350 A.2d 534 (1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 App. Div. 2d 388,411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978); Bost
v. Riley, 44 N.C. App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 194, 269 N.E.2d 391 (1980);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wash. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973 (1967); Utter v. United Hosp. Center, Inc.,
236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301
N.W.2d 156 (1981).
48. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161, modfied, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a (1982).
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article.49 Nevertheless, any consideration of hospital corporate negli-
gence in California would be incomplete without mention of two fac-
tors. The first is the Nork case,50 which may foreshadow definitions of
duty yet to come. The second is that there are restrictions both sub-
stantive and procedural placed upon hospitals in the exercise of their
duty by the rights of medical staff members and applicants.-"
1. Nork
Between 1965 and 1977, more than 60 lawsuits were filed in Sacra-
mento County against Dr. John Nork; 51 of them were fied between
1972 and 1974 and many of those were also lawsuits against Mercy
Hospitals of Sacramento. In what has come to be known as the Nork
case, 2 Mercy paid $500,000 to settle its share of the case, 3 but not
before Superior Court Judge B. Abbott Goldberg wrote an exhaustive
and erudite opinion which made it clear to hospitals that they would be
held responsible for failures of their quality assurance programs.
Nork was not a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, but he was nev-
ertheless allowed to perform orthopedic surgery.54 Evidence was intro-
duced that he performed more than three dozen operations which were
either negligently done, unnecessary, or both, and that he falsified pa-
tients' progress reports and diagnostic findings.55 Nork's accountant
testified that Nork needed money to stave off creditors and Nork him-
self testified that he was addicted to various drugs which affected his
judgment. 6
Judge Goldberg found that the hospital had no actual knowledge of
Nork's misconduct and that it had complied with the peer review sys-
tem then mandated by JCAH standards. While very sympathetic to
Mercy Hospital, the judge was unexcusing. He found that the hospital
49. See supra note 16.
50. Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cal. Nov. 27, 1973),
rev'd for failure to grant jury trial, 60 Cal. App. 3d 728, 31 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1976), rev'd and re-
manded, 20 Cal. 3d 500, 573 P.2d 458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1978).
51. While few states accord applicants and medical staff members procedural and substantive
rights which are as extensive as those accorded in California, the corporate negligence cases and
comments are strangely silent on this subject. One of the few exceptions is Arthur F. Southwick's
excellent article, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relationshi1
with the Staff Physician, 9 CALIF. W.L. REV. 429, 453-67 (1973). Professor Southwick also dis-
cusses applicant and member rights in his text, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE AD-
MINISTRTION, Ch. XIII, 427-65 (1978). See also Slawkowski, supra note 46, at 459-68; Comment,
supra note 16, at 382-88.
52. See supra note 50.
53. Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationshp, Hospital Responsibilityfor Malpractice of
Physicians, 50 WASH. L. REv. 385, 415, n.153; Ludlam, supra note 46.
54. Gonzales v. Nork, Civ. No. 228566, Memorandum of opinion.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id at 143, 148.
58. Id at 166.
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was not immunized from civil liability by the fact that it had complied
with applicable JCAH standards,5 9 nor because it functioned-as it was
required to function-through the medical staff.60 The oft-quoted clos-
ing6' to Judge Goldberg's opinion succinctly summarizes the principle
of corporate negligence.
I have reached the conclusion that the hospital is liable with great
reluctance, because I am sure that the Sisters of Mercy have done
everything within their power to run a proper institution. But they
like every hospital governing board, are corporately responsible for
the conduct of their medical staff. I do not anticipate that they will
suffer financially, because the ultimate responsibility rests on Dr.
Nork. "A person. . . who by the improper exercise of a legal power,
intentionally creates liability against the other, is liable to the other
for the . . . creation of liability." Restatement of Torts 871 (1939).
Mercy is a culprit, but it is also a victim.
As for the doctors on the Mercy staff, two thoughts keep going
through my mind. The one is from Dr. Jones: "No one told anyone
anything." The other is from Edmund Burke:
"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for
good men to do nothing."
2. Physician Rights
It should surprise no one that, in California, physicians in govern-
mental or public hospitals62 have both substantive and procedural con-
stitutional due process rights in the attainment and retention of medical
staff membership.63 Applicants for membership and medical staff
members in non-governmental or private hospitals64 also have substan-
tive and procedural rights under the common law of this State. Mem-
bership in a medical staff is deemed to be a "fundamental vested
right. 65 As a result, a hospital may not materially impair or terminate
that right without according the member "fair procedure." 66 Likewise,
59. Id
60. Id at 157.
61. See, e.g., Ludlam, supra note 46, at 759; Copeland, supra note 41, at 38.
62. For example, hospitals created and operated under the Local Hospital District Law, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, §§32000-32492.
63. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Tahoe Forest Hosp. District, 174 Cal. App. 2d 709, 345 P.2d 93 (1959);
Stretten v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976). Stretten is not a medical staff
case, but rather a case dealing with the termination of a physician's pathology residency. It con-
tains a detailed analysis of due process considerations, however.
64. The distinction between "public" and "private" hospitals in California is unclear, how-
ever, it was recently summarized in Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d
656, 183 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1982).
65. Unterthimer v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 33 Cal. 3d 285, 296, - P.2d -- - Cal. Rptr. -
(1983); Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 823, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 442, 453 (1977).
66. "Fair Procedure" in California is strictly a common law doctrine. Its origins can be
traced to the case of James v. Marinship, 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944), in which the court
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applicants for medical staff membership are entitled to fair procedure
in the event a medical staff committee 67  recommends against
appointment.68
Some courts have used the terms "fair procedure" and "due process"
interchangeably. 69 No doubt this stems from the fact that there is little,
if any, difference between them in the extent of protection afforded an
held that because of a labor union's monopoly-like control over the supply of labor, it could not
be permitted to exercise its power in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, injurious to others.
Thus, it was required to "surrender its monopoly or else admit to membership all qualified per-
sons." Id at 732, 155 P.2d at 335. The fair procedure principles enunciated in Marinship were
subsequently applied to membership in medical and dental professional societies on the theory
that, as a practical matter, membership was required for specialty practice. Pinsker v. Pacific
Coast Society of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 562 P.2d 253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974); Pinsker v.
Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1960);
Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Society, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623, 224 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974);
Kronen v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d 289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965).
On essentially the same theory, the requirement of fair procedure was extended to hospital medi-
cal staff membership matters in the landmark case Ascherman v. St. Francis Memorial Hosp., 45
Cal. App. 3d 507, 119 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1975). The doctrine of fair procedure has now been applied
to virtually all aspects of medical staff membership. See, e.g., Anton v. San Antonio Community
Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977) (reinstatement of staff privileges
and reappointment to medical staff); Hackethal v. Loma Linda Community Hosp. Corp., 91 Cal.
App. 3d 59, 153 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1979) (summary suspension and nonreappointment). It has even
been extended to employment in a residency training program. Ezekial v. Winkley, 20 Cal. 3d
267. 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
67. Usually is the executive committee or the credentials committee.
68. Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center, 27 Cal. 3d 614, 626, 614 P.2d 258, 265, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 826, 833 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Board of Directors, 104 Cal. App. 3d 648, 655, 163 Cal. Rptr.
831. (1980); Miller v. National Medical Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 3d 81, 91, 177 Cal. Rptr. 119, 125
(1981). The fair procedure analysis is somewhat analogous to the constitutional due process anal-
ysis. The former need for a state action equivalent passed with the abolition of the distinction
between public and private hospitals for fair procedure purposes in Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soci-
ety of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d at 554, 526 P.2d at 262, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255, and Ascherman v.
St. Francis Memorial Hosp., 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 509; but fair procedure still
requires a showing similar to the declaration of a property or a liberty interest in the due process
analysis. Thus, to be entitled to fair procedure, the affected physician must show that his ability to
fully practice his profession would be impaired by the hospital action. Id
The fact that fair procedure and due process might be confused was acknowledged by the court
in Pinsker as follows:
It is important to note that the legal duties imposed on defendant organizations arise
from the common law rather than the Constitution as such; although Pinsker I [v. Pacific
Coast Society of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623] utilized
"due process" terminology in describing defendant associations' obligations, the "due
process" concept is applicable only in its broadest, nonconstitutional connotation. In an
attempt to avoid confusing the common law doctrine involved in the instant case with
constitutional principles, we shall refrain from using "due process" language and shall
simply refer instead to a requirement of a "fair procedure."
Id at 550 n.7, 526 P.2d at 259, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
The distinction was again noted by the court inAscherman, 45 Cal. App. 3d at 511 n.4, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 509, and underscored by Justice Kane in the concurring portion of his concurring and
dissenting opinion, as follows:
Bearing in mind that we are dealing with common law-not constitutional-standards
of "fair procedure," we should not allow our decision to be formulated by "due process"
considerations which are not only inapplicable but, in my opinion, inappropriate to the
situation and the parties at bench.
Id at 515, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
The distinction between constitutional due process and common law fair procedure was most
recently reiterated in Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d at 653-54, 183
Cal. Rptr. at 431-33.
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individual.70 Fair procedure requires that the medical staff applicant or
member be given notice of the "charges" against him or her, a mean-
ingful opportunity to respond,7' and, if necessary, an impartial tribu-
nal.72 Good cause is also required to deny an application for
membership 73 or to discipline or expel a member.74
To appreciate the significance of Elam, one should realize that the
hospital is not entirely free to fulfill its duty to the patient to ensure
"the competence of its medical staff through the prudent selection, re-
view and continuing evaluation of the physicians granted staff privi-
leges."' 75  Rather, it must attempt to balance the physician's76 rights
against its duty to patients to ensure the competence of its medical staff.
The hospital may indeed find itself between the proverbial "rock and a
hard place"-being sued by the physician for expelling him from the
medical staff or being sued by his patient for not expelling him, or both.
To date, no appellate court in this State has addressed the issue of
physician rights in light of corporate negligence; however, the opinion
of the Supreme Court in Ezekial v. Winkley77 may foreshadow appel-
70. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 657, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
71. 12 Cal. 3d at 555, 526 P.2d at 263, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 255; 19 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 567 P.2d at
1178, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (1977).
72. Miller v. National Medical Hosp., 124 Cal. App. 3d at 90, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 124. The
JCAH requires that medical staff bylaws provide a fair hearing and appellate review mechanism
for medical staff applicants and members. 1982 ACCREDITATION MANUAL, supra note 26, at 103-
04. In the past, the JCAH has published JCAH Guidelines for the Formation of Medical Staff
Bylaws, Rules and Regulations, in the form of model bylaws which set forth hearing and appellate
review procedures. In 197 1, the California Medical Association and California Hospital Associa-
tion adopted and approved the CMA-CHA Uniform Code of Hearing & Appeal Procedures.
Both the JCAH guidelines and the CMA/CHA Hearing & Appeal Procedures have been judi-
cially noticed and tacitly approved by the California Supreme Court in a "fair procedure" case.
See Anton 19 Cal. 3d at 811, n.5, 818-20, n.16, n.17, 828, n.27, 567 P.2d at 1165, n.5, 1171, n.16,
n.17, 1177, n.27, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 445, n.5, 451, n.16, n.17, 457, n.27.
73. 27 Cal. 3d at 626, 614 P.2d at 265, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
74. Hackethal v. Loma Linda Community Hosp. Corp., 91 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 153 Cal. Rptr.
at 787.
Exactly what good cause entails is uncertain. It is a subject which has rarely been discussed by
the courts in medical staff cases. Just as the requisites of due process depend upon the nature of
the individual's rights involved, the amount of good cause required depends upon the action to be
undertaken. We know, for example, that summary suspension of all or part of a member's privi-
leges is usually justified only when immediate action (i.e., prior to a hearing) must be taken in the
interest of patient care. See, e.g., 91 Cal. App. 3d at 67, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 788. Cf. Avol v. Haw-
thorne Community Hosp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 101, 184 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1982). In other words, any-
thing less than an immediate threat to patient care is insufficient good cause for summary
suspension.
There is a second factor to be considered in analyzing good cause, but it has not yet been raised
in any reported appellate decision in California. That factor is the nature of the hospital taking
the disciplinary action. For example, what might be good cause for imposing only a consultation
requirement on a member of one hospital's medical staff might be good cause for terminating the
same member's privileges in another, presumably smaller, hospital which could not provide a
consultant or fairly be asked to pay for one.
75. Elam, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
76. Membership on a hospital medical staff is not limited to physicians. In Elam, the alleg-
edly negligent surgery was performed by a podiatrist member of the medical staff. The term
"physician" is used here only for convenience.
77. 20 Cal. 3d 267, 572 P.2d 32, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1977).
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late opinions yet to come. Ezekial was a surgical resident and, thus, an
employee of the hospital. He challenged his dismissal from the hospi-
tal's surgical residency program. The hospital raised its potential civil
liability for Ezekial's malpractice as a justification for his dismissal.
The Supreme Court responded as follows:
Finally, defendants find significance in the fact that they are civilly
liable for any malpractice by plaintiff as a hospital employee,
whereas they might not be responsible for the acts or omissions of
independent physicians holding staff privileges. From the foregoing
it is argued that defendants' interest in protecting themselves against
the incompetency of residents is greater than in protecting against the
mistakes and errors of staff physicians, thereby presumably creating
a greater legitimate incentive to terminate summarily residents whose
performance is marginal.
We are sensitive to the difficulty and danger, on the one hand, of
any undue restrictions on the essential ability of a hospital to disci-
pline its professional staff thereby controlling its professional per-
formances, while, on the other hand, malpractice liability is imposed
on the hospital for its failure to exercise such control. We emphasize,
however, that defendants are not precluded from dismissing plaintiff
for incompetence. We hold only that, in doing so, they must afford
him rudimentary procedural and substantive fairness. Moreover, the
hospital is, of course, not prevented from immediately suspending a
resident with pay, or placing him on noncritical duties, pending a fair
determination of his competence in the residency program. Such
procedures, we think, offer the hospital a practical and adequate tem-
porary means of protecting the health and safety of its patients.78
QUESTIONS IN THE WAKE OF ELAM
A. The Parties Questions
I Are Medical Staffs Potential Defendants in Corporate Negligence
Cases?
Any consideration of bringing suit against a medical staff must begin
with a determination of the legal status of such entities.7 9 If medical
staffs are independent unincorporated associations,8 0 as some believe,81
78. Id at 277-78, 572 P.2d at 39, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
79. The legal status of the medical staff is subject to debate. Even within the health care
industry there is argument. The Hospital Council of Southern California has taken the position
that medical staffs are "non-entities." See the Council's study entitled LEGAL REPRESENTATION
OF THE MEDICAL STAFF, published in Spring 1982. A copy is on file in the authors' office. The
California Medical Association rejects the Hospital Council's position. Its legal counsel opines
that medical staffs are legal, recognized organizations. See 26 CMA NEws 1 (October 29, 1982).
It is somewhat ironic that liability can be imposed on a medical staff only if the medical staff is a
legal entity (capable of being sued), which is exactly what the CMA is contending.
80. Witkin defines an unincorporated association as "a group of persons who have joined
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then they are subject to being sued.8 2 If they are not unincorporated
associations,8 3 then they are not subject to suit and the inquiry ends
there.
If the medical staff is an entity capable of being sued, then its poten-
tial liability as an entity should turn on the determination of whether it
has any duty directly to hospital patients to ensure the competence of
its own members. The concept of duty is somewhat amorphous. Dean
Prosser put it best:
Its artificial character is readily apparent; in the ordinary case, if
the court should desire to find liability, it would be quite as easy to
find the necessary "relation" in the position of the parties toward one
another, and hence to extend the defendant's duty to the plaintiff.
The statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential ques-
tion-whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant's conduct. It is therefore not surprising to find
that the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law of negligence,
and that no universal test for it ever has been formulated. It is a
shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in
itself. It is embedded far too firmly in our law to be discarded, and
no satisfactory substitute for it, by which the defendant's responsibil-
ity may be limited, has been devised. But it should be recognized
that "duty" is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the
sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say
that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.
84
Despite its limitations, there is no substitute for the concept of duty.
It is the key to the analysis of corporate negligence and its present and
potential effect.
The result in Elam was the product of the court's extending the pre-
viously existing limits of the duty owed by a hospital to its patients to
include the duty to ensure the competence of its medical staff. In so
together for some common purpose." 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corpora-
tions, §36, at 4347 (8th ed. 1974). A statutory nonprofit association is defined as an "unincorpo-
rated association of natural persons for religious, scientific, social, literary, educational,
recreational, benevolent, or other purpose not that of pecuniary profit." CAL. COR. CODE
§21000.
81. The California Supreme Court, in dicta, has referred to one medical staff as an unincor-
porated association. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 809, 567 P.2d at 1164,
140 Cal. Rptr. at 444; see also St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St. John Regional Medical Center,
Inc., 245 N.W.2d 472 (S. Dak. 1976); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 238 N.J. Super. 302, 350
A.2d 534 (1975).
82. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §388(a).
83. For those taking this position, see, e.g., Horty & Mulholland, The Legal Status of the
HospitalMedical Staff, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 485 (1978); Comment, supra note 5. The authors have
also taken the position that medical staffs are not unincorporated associations. See Loveridge, The
Hospital Medical Staff and its Legal Status, 2 CALIFORNIA HEALTH LAW NEws 14 (July 1982); G.
Loveridge, The Legal Status of the Hospital Medical Staff (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file
in the authors' office).
84. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §54, at 325-26 (4th ed. 1971).
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doing, the Elam court held itself true to the spirit of Professor Prosser.
It not only applied a conventional "test" for duty, but it also considered
other factors, including public policy, which led it to conclude that
Elam was "entitled to protection" from the Hospital's conduct."'
The "test" utilized by the Elam court begins with the provisions of
section 1714 of the California Civil Code8 6 which imposes liability for
injuries caused by failure to exercise ordinary care under the circum-
stances and then balances the factors of foreseeability of harm to the
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff will be harmed, the
moral blame attributable to the defendant's conduct, the burdensome-
ness to the defendant and the consequences to the community of im-
posing a duty and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance.8 7
As a practical matter, any court that wants to find a medical staff duty
directly to hospital patients should have little trouble doing so. If a
court does nothing more than to apply the same "test" used by the
Elam court, it may well find that the medical staff, as an independent
entity,88 has a duty directly to patients to ensure the competence of its
members. That result would be largely determined by the emphasis
placed on the factor of foreseeability by the court.8 9 In other words, if
the medical staff fails to ensure the competence of its own members by
making inappropriate recommendations or by not making appropriate
recommendations to the governing body for member appointment or
discipline, then injury to the plaintiff is highly foreseeable because gov-
erning bodies rarely disapprove medical staff recommendations."
Standing alone, however, that analysis is incomplete. A proper analy-
sis of the medical staff duty question should track the Elam court's ex-
amination of hospital duty by including the same basic factors of
public policy and practicality and taking into account the overall regu-
latory scheme which dictates responsibilities within the hospital.
As discussed above, the operation of a hospital is highly regulated. 91
The responsibilities of the governing body with respect to the quality of
85. Id at 325.
86. Section 1714(a) provides in relevant part as follows:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his property or person ....
87. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 339-40, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160. The test employed by theElam court is
substantially the same test established by the Supreme Court in J-Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.
3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
88. See supra note 78.
89. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 340, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
90. A 1979 "confidential survey of medical staff coordinators at major southern California
hospitals" indicated the hospital governing bodies accept and comply with medical staff executive
and credentials committee recommendations virtually 100% of the time. See, Comment, Piercing
the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEOO L. REV. 383, 394, n.70 (1980).
91. See supra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
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care rendered in the hospital are clearly set forth by statute,92 regula-
tion93 and accreditation standards. 94 The duty of the medical staff is
equally plain. The legislators, bureaucrats and private regulators have
made the governing body responsible to hospital patients, that is, im-
posed a duty on the governing body to ensure the competence of the
medical staff, and they have made the medical staff responsible to the
governing body, not to hospital patients, for the competence of its mem-
bers. Thus, the question of whether the medical staff owes a duty di-
rectly to hospital patients has been circumscribed by the extensive
regulatory scheme which dictates the internal responsibilities within
hospitals.
The lack of medical staff duty to hospital patients is also solidly
grounded in considerations of public policy and practicality. In addi-
tion to acknowledging the regulatory scheme which makes the gov-
erning body responsible to hospital patients for the competence of the
medical staff,95 the Elam court also found that the public looks to the
hospital for total health care.
Further, [imposition of a duty on the hospital to exercise respon-
sible care to ensure the competency of the medical staff] is consonant
with the public's perception of the modem hospital as a mutlifaceted,
health-care facility responsible for the quality of medical care and
treatment rendered. The community hospital has evolved into a cor-
porate institution, assuming "the role of a comprehensive health
center ultimately responsible for arranging and coordinating total
health care." The patient treated in such a facility receives care from
a number of individuals of varying capacities and not merely treated
by a physician acting in isolation. The patient relies upon the effec-
tiveness of this "highly integrated system of activities . .. ."
Consequently, "[t]he concept that a hospital does not undertake to
treat patients, does not undertake to act through its doctors and
nurses, but only procures them to act solely upon their own responsi-
bility, no longer reflects the fact. The complex manner of operation
of the modem-day medical institution clearly demonstrates that they
furnish far more than mere facilities for treatment. They appoint
physicians and surgeons to their medical staffs, as well as regularly
employing on a salary basis resident physicians and surgeons, nurses,
administrative and manual workers and they charge patients for
medical diagnosis, care, treatment and therapy, receiving payment
for such services through privately financed medical insurance poli-
cies and government financed programs known as Medicare and
Medicaid. Certainly, the person who avails himself of our modem
92. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
95. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 341-44, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
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'hospital facilities' (frequently a medical teaching institution) expects
that the hospital staff will do all it reasonably can to cure him and
does not anticipate that its nurses, doctors and other employees will
be acting solely on their own responsibility."96
In addition, the medical staff is an unlikely defendant since it lacks
assets to satisfy damages arising from patient injuries caused by failure
to ensure a competent medical staff. Generally, the assets of a medical
staff are little more than accrued dues. Individual members of the
medical staff may of course be joined in an action against the medical
staff97 but satisfaction of any judgment against the medical staff should
ordinarily be limited to its assets. 98
Last and very important is the fact that imposition of a medical staff
duty directly to hospital patients would have what might be termed a
"chilling effect" on participation in peer review, in contravention of
both law and regulations that require physicians to belong to medical
staffs in order to practice in hospitals and public policy which encour-
ages physicians to play an active role in health care. 99 It bears noting
that the Elam court acknowledged that imposition of a duty of care on
the hospital should supply incentive for the hospital to assure medical
staff competence and quality care. tee The disincentive to medical staff
membership and active participation which would result from imposi-
tion of a duty of care on the medical staff is no less clear.
Finally, no discussion of the potential of the medical staff as a de-
fendant is complete without mention of the case of Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hospital."0 ' In Corleto, a New Jersey trial court judge al-
lowed a medical staff to be named as a defendant in a malpractice case
alleging, inter alia, its peer review failure by allowing a physician to
perform surgery whom it knew or should have known to be incompe-
tent to do so. 10 2 The case is prefaced on the court's characterization of
the medical staff as an unincorporated association under New Jersey
96. Id at 344-45, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163 (quoting Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp.,
301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (Wis. 1981)).
97. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §388(b).
98. CAL. CORP. CODE §24002; ef Steuer v. Phelps, 41 Cal. App. 3d 468, 116 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1974).
99. The extent of encouragement to physicians to participate in peer review activities is evi-
dent in the various immunities granted them for their participation. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE
§§43.7, 47; CAL. EVID. CODE §§1156, 1157.
100. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
101. 350 A.2d 534 (NJ. Super. 1975).
102. The medical stafi's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was denied by the trial
court judge. Under New Jersey law, an order denying a motion to dismiss is not appealable as of
right, but may be appealed with leave of the appellate division. N.J. R. CT. 2:2-2, 2:2-3. The
medical staff and other defendants sought leave to file an appeal, filed a brief, but did not have
oral argument. The appellate division denied leave to appeal without issuing an opinion. See
Horty & Mulholland, supra note 83, at 486.
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law"°3 and, thus, subject to suit; but it is completely devoid of any dis-
cussion of the medical staff's duty to the injured patient. The case was
settled before trial." 4 It has been widely and deservedly criticized 5
and should not be of any influence whatsoever on a California court
considering the potential liability of a hospital medical staff.
2. Are Medical Staffs Potential Cross-defendants in Corporate
Negligence Cases: Will Hospitals and Their Medical
Staffs Cross-complain against Each Other to
Shy? or Allocate Responsibilityfor
Quality Assurance Failures?
The medical staff's duty to the hospital to perform the quality assur-
ance functions delegated to it is established, again, in the regulatory
scheme. 1° Thus, under principles of both tort and agency law, 0 7 the
medical staff could well be named as a cross-defendant in a cross-com-
plaint by the hospital which is itself being sued for corporate negli-
gence. This, however, will probably never happen.
These suits would be fruitless, if not counter-productive, for several
reasons. First, as noted above, medical staffs lack sufficient assets to
make these suits economically viable.' Second, medical staffs do not
currently carry their own insurance separate and apart from hospital
insurance. Third, these suits would undoubtedly prove to be disastrous
to the relationships between the hospital governing body, administra-
tion and medical staff.
3. Are Individual Medical Staff Members Who Serve on Quality
Assurance Committees Potential Defendants in Corporate
Negligence Cases?
In its opinion, the Elam court made several references' 0 9 to a law
review comment in which the student-author proposes that liability for
failure to assure competent care should be imposed directly upon the
physicians who had actual notice of the malpracticing physician's in-
ompetene. 110 The Elam court, however, did not address the question
103. 350 A.2d at 539.
104. Horty & Mulholland, supra note 83, at 497; Hollowell, Corleto: A Paper Tiger, THE
HEALTH LAWYER 1 (Summer 1982).
105. See, e.g., Horty & Mulholland, supra note 83; Zaslow,A4 New Reasonfor Liability: Hospi-
talMedical StaffMembership, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 20 (Feb. 1977); Comment, supra note 5, at 396-97.
106. See supra notes 29-30, 35 and accompanying text.
107. An agent is generally liable to his principal for loss suffered by the principal because of
the agent's breach of duty. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §401 (1958).
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. 132 Cal. App. 3d at 337, 345-46, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 159, 164.
110. Comment, supra note 5.
Pacfc Law Journal / Vol 14
of individual member liability for peer review failures, since none was
alleged.
The student-commentator supports his "better solution"'' on the
basis that it is a logical alternative to corporate negligence,' 12 which he
sees as being essentially unfair to the hospital since only the medical
staff has the requisite ability to avert future malpractice." 3 Implicit in
the comment is the assumption that a cause of action will lie against
individual members, and that is certainly doubtful.
The question of individual member liability for quality assurance
failures must be analyzed as another duty question under the law of
torts, 1 4 and also as a question of agency law. Simply stated, the first
question is whether individual committee members have a duty directly
to hospital patients to exercise reasonable care to ensure the compe-
tency of the medical staff." 5 The answer is that they do not. All of the
reasons which compel the conclusion that the medical staffper se has
no duty to patients apply equally to the individual member. Here,
however, it would be difficult to find a duty even if one wanted to find
one. Recall that the court in Elam applied a balancing test of a handful
of factors to begin its duty analysis. The most important of the factors
was forseeability. Whereas, it is foreseeable that, if the medical staff as
an entity failed in its delegated quality assurance task, a plaintiff pa-
tient would get hurt, the same is not true of individual members of
quality assurance committees. Individual committee members alone
cannot fail to make the proper recommendations or make the improper
recommendation that will ultimately be approved by the hospital's gov-
erning body and be put into effect.
Similarly, the whole regulatory scheme, fixing in the governing body
the responsibility for medical staff competence, compels a finding of no
duty. Finally, if imposing a duty directly to patients on the medical
staffperse may be said to have a chilling effect on medical staff partici-
pation in quality assurance activities, then to impose that duty upon
individual committee members would absolutely freeze those activities
111. Id at 397.
112. Id at 398.
113. Id at 399.
114. The student-commentator reaches his conclusion without any analysis of the individual
member's duty.
115. The duty, or lack thereof, discussed here has nothing whatsoever to do with a physician's
common law (and ethical) duty to report suspected misconduct or wrongdoing. There is no
mandatory reporting statute in California, as there is in at least fifteen other states. There is,
however, a fiduciary duty on physicians to protect their patients which includes "a duty to make
full and fair disclosure of all facts which materially affect their rights or interests." O'Kane v.
Board of Registered Nursing, 3 Civ. 19616, April 1, 1982, at 16; see also Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 11, 15, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 (1962).
1983 / Hospital Corporate Negligence
within the hospital because physicians would refuse to serve on quality
assurance committees.
When they sit on medical staff committees, medical staff members
act as agents or subagents of the hospital. If committee members owe
no duty directly to patients, then it is unlikely that they will have direct
liability to the patient under the law of agency. Generally, the law of
agency provides that, although a third person may suffer loss or injury
as a result of an agent's failure to perform his duties to his principal, if
that breach of duty to the principal is unaccompanied by any act or
omission of the agent which breaches a duty owing to the third person,
no cause of action accrues in favor of the latter against the agent." 6 In
other words, a patient would not have a personal action against a com-
mittee member unless he could show that the committee member owed
a duty to him in addition to whatever duty the committee member
owed to the hospital.
In addition to the foregoing duty and agency analysis, there is one
final obstacle to be overcome by a plaintiff seeking to impose liability
on individual committee members: the immunity conferred by Califor-
nia Civil Code section 43.7.117 Even if there is duty owed by individual
committee members directly to patients, section 43.7 defines the stan-
dard of care they must exercise to be nothing more than an absence of
malice! Section 43.7 protects medical staff members from liability aris-
ing out of their participation in the peer review process, as long as they
act without malice, make a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
116. In United States Liab. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 778, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 418 (1970), the Supreme Court stated the proposition in traditional nonfea-
sance/misfeasance terms:
[Agents] are not responsible to third persons for negligence amounting merely to non-
feasance, to a breach of duty owing to the [principal] alone; the act must also constitute a
breach of duty owed to the third person.
Id at 595, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 463 P.2d at 775.
Section 343 of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY and section 2343 of the California Civil
Code should not be co. fused with the principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Haidinger-
Hayes. They both involve liability based upon the agent's duty to a third person. Haidinger-
Hayes establishes the absence of an agent's duty to a third person and the resulting absence of
liability.
117. Section 43.7 provides in relevant part as follows:
There shall be no monetary liability on the part of and no cause of action for damages
shall arise against. . . a duly appointed member of a committee of a professional staff of
a licensed hospital (provided the professional staff operates pursuant to written bylaws
that have been approved by the governing board of the hospital)... or any member of
any peer review committee whose purpose is to review the quality of medical or dental
services rendered by physicians and surgeons, dentists or dental hygienists, which com-
mittee is composed chiefly of physicians and surgeons, dentists, or dental hygienists, of
any member of the governing board of a hospital in reviewing the quality of medical
services rendered by members of the staff if such committee or board member acts with-
out malice, has made a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which he
or she acts, and acts in reasonable belief that the action taken by him or her is warranted
by the facts known to him or after such reasonable effort to obtain facts....
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matter as to which they act and act in a reasonable belief that the action
taken by them is warranted by the facts.' 18
4. Are Medical Staff Peer Review Committees Potential Parties in
Corporate Negligence Cases?
Consideration of medical staff peer review committees as potential
parties in corporate negligence cases begins and ends with the status of
such entities. Whereas there is considerable debate over the status of a
medical staff per se, n 9 it is simply untenable to assert that committees
of the medical staff are anything other than organizational units of the
hospital or of the medical staff. In short, they have no status as a legal
entity which would enable them to be sued.
5. Are Individual Members of the Hospitals Governing Body
Potential Defendants in a Corporate Negligence Case?
In addition to naming the medical staff as a defendant in his mal-
practice case, the plaintiff in the New Jersey case of Corleto v. Shore
Memorial Hospital2 ' named the individual members of the hospital's
governing body.' 2' Their motion to dismiss, along with the medical
staff's, 122 was overruled. Owing to the critical reaction, however, one
might think that each trustee had been held liable for thousands of
dollars in damages. 12
Individual members are indeed potential defendants in a corporate
negligence case;' 24 the likelihood of success is quite another matter.
The question should be analyzed in accordance with established princi-
ples of corporate, agency and tort law.' 25 Ordinarily, members of hos-
pital governing bodies (directors) should not become personally liable
118. The nature and extent of the immunity conferred by section 47.3 was recently recounted
in Long v. Pinto, 126 Cal. App. 3d 946, 179 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1981). The potential liability of peer
review participants, as well as various immunities, are discussed in Comment, The LegalLlabllity
of Medical Peer Review Partic&pantsfr Revocation of Hospital StaffPrvileges, 28 DRAKE L. REV.
692 (1978-79).
119. See supra note 79.
120. 350 A.2d 534 (NJ. Super. 1975).
121. 350 A.2d at 535.
122. See supra note 102.
123. See, e.g., T. MULROY, HOSPITAL LIABILITY REVISITED: How GOVERNING BOARDS CAN
PROTECT THEMSELVES AND IMPROVE PATIENT CARE (1980) and comments discussed therein at 1-
9. While implying that the Corleto decision has or might have engendered panic by hospital
directors (and their attorneys), Id at 3, Mulroy opines that, "unless the doctrine [expressed in
Corleto] is hereafter repudiated by a significant appellate tribunal, hospital directors would be
well advised to treat it with respect as the existing law of the land." Id at 11.
124. One member of a hospital's board of trustees has been named in some of the consolidated
cases entitled Katie Cichy v. William Miofsky, M.D., set for trial in early 1983 in the Superior
Court of Sacramento County. They are, inter alia, corporate negligence cases.
125. One commentator has analyzed potential director liability in terms of the nature of the
hospital entity: for-profit private, nonprofit private and nonprofit public charitable. Hackler, Hos-
pital Trustees' Fiduciary Responsibilities: An Emerging Trpartite Distinction, 15 WASHBURN L.J.
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to patients for the failure of their corporation to ensure the competence
of its medical staff through careful selection and review. As prescribed
in Elam, corporate negligence arises out of the failure of a hospital to
adequately review the performance of medical staff members or to
properly evaluate applicants for membership. The role of the gov-
erning body in the review process is normally limited to reviewing the
recommendations of the medical staff. In fact, as repeatedly noted
above, the governing body is required by accreditation standards, stat-
utes and regulations to delegate to the medical staff the authority to
evaluate the professional competence of staff members and applicants
for membership. Directors are entitled to rely on such recommenda-
tions, unless they have some knowledge which places doubt on the effi-
cacy of the reports.l16 Consequently, a hospital may be found to have
breached its duty to an injured patient despite the fact that the directors
fully complied with their standard of care to the corporation.
The standard of care for directors of corporations in California is
essentially the same, regardless of whether the particular corporation is
commercial, for-profit, nonprofit mutual benefit or nonprofit public
benefit. 27 This general standard has three elements: a director must
perform his or her duties in good faith, in a manner that the director
believes is in the best interest of the corporation and with such care,
including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances.' 28 This standard,
which has been called the "business judgment rule," protects directors
from liability for honest mistakes.129 It applies regardless of whether or
not directors are compensated for their services. It also applies to the
performance of directors while acting on board committees. 130 The re-
quirement that a director act in good faith is a subjective requirement.
It is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of
purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and faithfulness to one's
duty or obligation.'
The director's exercise of that degree of skill and attention which an
ordinary prudent person in a similar position of responsibility would
use under similar circumstances generally involves such things as at-
tendance of board meetings and adequate review of agenda and re-
422 (1976). He does not specifically address the question of director or trustee liability for hospital
corporate negligence.
126. CAL. CORP. CODE §§309(b), 523(b), 7231(b).
127. Id §§309, 5231 & 7231.
128. Id §§309(a), 5231(a), 7231(a).
129. BALLENTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS §102.01 (4th ed. 1982).
130. Id
131. ld; see, ag., Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d 187, 192, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251
(1967).
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ports.'32 It also includes the obligation to make reasonable inquiry. In
other words, directors must, if put on notice by an unusual event or
report, make such additional inquiries as an ordinary prudent person in
the director's position would make in similar circumstances. 33
A standard of care only makes sense in conjunction with the duties to
which it attaches. While it is true that the law provides that the activi-
ties and affairs of a corporation shall be conducted and all corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the direction of the governing
body, 34 it is also true that the law permits governing bodies to delegate
the management of the activities of the corporation to various persons
or committees, as long as the governing body retains the ultimate con-
trol and direction. 3 In reality, very few, if any, hospital governing
bodies manage the day-to-day activities of their corporations. Conse-
quently, the ability of a director to rely on reports from his or her dele-
gates is very important.
Generally, a director of a corporation does not incur personal liabil-
ity for the torts of the corporation merely by reason of his or her mem-
bership on its governing body. If, however, a director commits or
participates in the commission of a corporate tort, he may be found
liable to injured third persons.' 36 In other words, directors are person-
ally liable to third parties for their own torts which are the proximate
cause of the injury. 137
In light of the acknowledged limitations of the concept of duty, the
question is not so much whether a hospital director has a personal duty
to the hospital patient to ensure the competence of the members of the
medical staff, but rather whether society would be served by creating
such a duty. To date, only the court in Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hos-
pital 38 has concluded that society would be served by the imposition of
personal liability.
The imposition of personal liability on a director for the failure of a
hospital to ensure the competency of its medical staff is in reality both
unwarranted and unnecessary. Hospital directors lack the expertise to
make independent evaluations of the medical care rendered by medical
132. BALLENTINE & STERLING, supra note 138, §102.01.
133. Id
134. CAL. CORP. CODE §300(a).
135. Id
136. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 785, 598 P.2d 45, 52, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392,
399 (1978); see also United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d at 595, 463
P.2d at 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
137. See, eg., Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. App. 2d 714, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1967) (interfer-
ence with contractual relations); Price v. Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1964)
(conspiracy to defraud).
138. 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. 1975).
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staff members. The various requirements of delegation to the medical
staff are based on the concept that only the medical staff has the compe-
tence to review the quality of medical care provided at the hospital.
Furthermore, the relationship between an individual director and a
prospective hospital patient is remote. A patient looks to the hospital
as a whole for his or her health needs, not to individual directors. In
short, the criteria used by the Elam court to expand the hospital's duty
to its patients simply do not support the creation of a director's in-
dependent duty to patients.139
Lastly, it appears that California Civil Code section 43.7140 will act to
shield directors from personal liability in most cases. It protects them
so long as they act without malice, make a reasonable effort to obtain
the facts of the matter as to which they act, and act in a reasonable
belief that the action taken by them is warranted by the facts. 141 The
standard of care described in Civil Code section 43.7 is remarkably
similar to the standard of care for directors described in the Corpora-
tions Code. 142 For instance, acting "in good faith" is the equivalent to
acting "without malice;" acting in a manner that the director believes is
in the best interest of the corporation is similar to acting in a reasonable
belief that the action taken is warranted by the facts; and acting with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinary prudent person
in a like position would use under similar circumstances is similar to
making a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which
they act. Thus, directors who meet the standard of care they owe their
corporations should also meet the standard of care, if any, owed to pa-
tients. They will not be found liable for honest mistakes, or for reason-
ably relying on medical staff recommendations.
43
139. The foregoing analysis assumes that the directors do not have special knowledge of a
physician's incompetence to practice or otherwise actively participate in a knowing decision toappoint or reappoint an incompetent physician to the medical staff. For example, if a medical
staff recommended to the board that a physician be appointed to the staffdespite the fact that the
sician was incompetent (perhaps the physician was a known drug abuser, but the directorew or believed that the physici n would donate a new wing to the hospital if appointed to the
medical staff) and the board accepted the staff's recommendation, then a court could properly findthat the director participated or directed the corporate tort, thereby imposing personal liability on
the director.
140. For th ext of section 43.7(b) sec supra note 124.
Subsection (e) of'Civil Code section 43.7 expressly denies to hospitals the same immunity it
confers on trustees; however, on March 2, 1983, a bil was introduced into the Assembly that, if
passed, would apparently contradict subsection (e) by conferring immunity on hospitals for any
act or proceeding when individual medical staff committee members would have immunity under
section 43.7(b). See A.B. 1261, 1983-84 Cal. Leg. Reg. Ses.
141. CAL. CIV. CODE §43.7.
142. CAL. CORP. CODE §§309(a), 5321(a), 7231(a).
143. After the Corleto decision, a great deal of literature was published for hospital directors,
both warning them about their potential liability and advising them how to avoid the perceived
pitfalls. See, e.g., T. MULROY, HosPITAL LIABILITY REVISITED: How GOVERNING BOARDS CAN
PROTECT THEMSELVES AND IMPROVE PATIENT CARE (1980); R. CUNNINGHAM, GOVERNING Hos-
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B. The Proof Questions
L How Can a Plaint#(TProve a Claim that the Hospital Breached
its Duty of Using Reasonable Care in the Selection and
Retention of the Members of its Medical Staff.
As discussed above, the hospital delegates to its medical staff the re-
sponsibility for evaluating applications for membership and the profes-
sional competence of staff members, that is, the responsibility for selec-
tion and retention of medical staff members. Thus, to defend itself
against a charge of corporate negligence, the hospital will want to show
that the various medical staff committees did their job. The plaintiff
will need to show that they did not.
a. Section 1157 of the California Evidence Code Prevents the
Discovery of Medical Staff Committee Records in
Corporate Negligence Cases.
Useful, if not indispensible, sources of information about Whether or
not the medical staff committees did their job are medical staff commit-
tee records and the testimony of the committee members. However, the
discovery of the proceedings and records of medical staff committees
that are performing quality assurance functions is prohibited by section
1157 of the Evidence Code. t " Section 1157 was enacted in 1968 upon
the theory that external access to peer investigations conducted by
medical staff committees would inhibit effective physician participation
in peer review activities. 145 Apparently it came in response to a mal-
PITALS: TRUSTEES AND THE NEW ACCOUNTABILITIES (1976); A. BERNSTEIN, A TRUSTEE'S GUIDE
TO HOSPITAL LAW (1981). By and large, these publications urge directors to become more actively
involved in the operation of the hospital. While that might be good for the hospital, the more
actively involved they become, the more directors run the risk of being accused of participating in
the hospital's tort.
144. Section 1157 provides as follows:
Neither the proceedings nor the records of organized committees of medical or medi-
cal-dental staffs in hospitals having the responsibility of evaluation and improvement of
the quality of care rendered in the hospital or medical or dental review or dental hygien-
ist review or chiropractive review committees of local medical, dental, dental hygienist,
or chiropractic societies shall be subject to discovery. Except as hereinafter provided, no
person in attendance at a meeting of any such committee shall be required to testify as to
what transpired thereat. The prohibition relating to discovery or testimony shall not
apply to the statements made by any person in attendance at such a meeting who is a
party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of which was reviewed at such meet-
ing, or to any person requesting hospital staff privileges, or in any action against an
insurance carrier alleging bad faith by the carrier in refusing to accept a settlement offer
within the policy limits.
The prohibitions contained in this section shall not apply to medical, dental, dental
hygienist, or chiropractic society committees that exceed 10 percent of the membership
of the society, nor to any such committee if any person serves upon the committee when
his own conduct or practice is being reviewed.
145. Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974).
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practice case 146 in which the court ordered production of hospital
records dealing with medical staff disciplinary proceedings against a
physician. 147 It is based on a legislative judgment that confidential
treatment of committee records will enhance the quality of the in-hos-
pital medical practice 48 and is aimed directly at malpractice actions in
which a present or former hospital staff doctor is a defendant. 149
Section 1157 itself carves out three exceptions to its broad prohibi-
tion against discovery. The first provides that the immunity does not
apply to the "statements made by any person in attendance at such a
meeting who is a party to an action or proceeding the subject matter of
which was reviewed at such meeting. ... '50 This exception was the
subject of judicial interpretation in the case of Schulz v. Superior
Court. 5' In Schulz, the plaintiff asserted that the foregoing statutory
exception applies whenever a staff doctor and a hospital are named as
defendants in a malpractice case.' 5 2 The appellate court disagreed, say-
ing that such a conclusion ". . . would not only achieve an absurd re-
sult, but would render sterile the immunity provisions of the statute." 153
The court specifically held that the exception does not apply to mal-
practice proceedings in which a doctor or a hospital has been made a
party, but rather it applies to permit discovery in suits by doctors claim-
ing arbitrary or wrongful exclusion from hospital staff privileges.' 54
The Schulz decision makes somewhat redundant the second excep-
tion, that the prohibition relating to discovery does not apply to any
person requesting hospital staff privileges.'5 This exception was inter-
preted to also apply to contract physician disputes in Roseville Commu-
ni y Hospital v. Superior Court.'s6 The third, and very narrow,
exception provides that the prohibition relating to discovery shall not
apply "in any action against an insurance carrier alleging bad faith by
the carrier in refusing to accept a settlement offer within the policy
limits."' 15
7
Eight years before the Elam decision, the question of the discovery of
medical staff committee records in a hospital corporate negligence case
146. Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967).
147. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 320; Holbrook, Medical Malpractice Litigation:
The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' QualityvAssurance Committee Records, 16 WASHBURN L.
REV. 64, 70 (1976).
148. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
149. Id
150. CAL. EVID. CODE §1157.
151. 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal.-Rptr. 67 (1977).
152. Id at 445, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
153. Id
154. Id at 446, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
155. CAL. EVID. CODE §1157.
156. 70 Cal. App. 3d 809, 139 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1977).
157. CAL. EvID. CODE §1157.
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was squarely addressed in Matchett v. Superior Court. 58 Matchett was
a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action. He alleged that, while a
patient in the hospital, he suffered injuries resulting from the doctor's
negligent treatment and from the negligence of the hospital in admit-
ting and retaining the doctor on its staff without adequate inquiry or
control over his competence. 159 In short, it contained a corporate negli-
gence cause of action against the hospital indistinguishable from the
cause of action upheld in Elam.
Matchett sought pretrial discovery of hospital and medical staff com-
mittee records, including records of the credentials committee, the
medical executive committee and the tissue committee.' 60 The hospital
refused to produce the records, claiming that they were protected by
section 1157.161 Matchett argued that the exception relating to persons
requesting staff privileges applied, in that his lawsuit charged the hospi-
tal with negligent selection or retention of a "person requesting hospital
staff privileges."' 162 The appellate court disagreed. It held that the pro-
tection provided by section 1157 applied even though the hospital was
also named as a defendant. 63 After observing that section 1157 might
".. . seriously jeopardize or even prevent the plaintiff's recovery,"''T
the court went on to state that "[s]ection 1157 represents a legislative
choice between competing public concerns. It embraces the goal of
medical staff candor at the cost of impairing plaintiffs' access to
evidence."165
In summary, Evidence Code section 1157 and the relatively few cases
that have construed it 166 clearly limit the discoverability of medical
staff committee proceedings, thereby preventing plaintiffs from ob-
taining important evidence which they might need to prove that a hos-
pital negligently selected or retained a physician on its staff.
b. Placing the Burden of Explanation on the Hospital-Res Ipsa
Loquitur
The doctrine of res ispa loquitur may regain for some plaintiffs the
ground they lost by their inability to discover medical staff committee
158. 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974).
159. Id at 626, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 318.
160. Id.
161. Id at 627, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
162. Id at 628, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
163. Id at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
164. Id at 629, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 320-21.
165. Id
166. In addition to Matchell, Schulz and Roseville Community Hosp., see also, County of Kern
v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 396, 147 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1978), Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial
Hosp. v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 626, 146 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1978) and American Mutual
Liability Insurance Company v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1974).
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records because of Evidence Code section 1157. Under present law, res
ivsa loquitur is known as a presumption affecting the burden of produc-
ing evidence.'67 The res /psa loquitur doctrine is not simply a technical
evidentiary rule of uncertain but ancient ancestry. 68 It grows out of a
concern for fairness. An example of that concern can be found in the
following comments of the California Supreme Court:
"The increasing use of res &Psa loquitur exemplifies the growing rec-
ognition of the courts of the special obligations which arise from par-
ticular relationships." In cases in which "the particular defendant is
in a position of some special responsibility toward the plaintiff or the
public," the doctrine protects the dependent party from unexplained
injury at the hands of one in whom he has reposed trust. "In an
integrated society where individuals become inevitably dependent
upon others for the exercise of due care, where these relationships are
closely interwoven with our daily living, the requirement for expla-
nation is not too great a burden to impose upon those who wield the
instruments of injury and whose due care is vital to iffe itsef.' 6 9
It is not difficult to find a description of a hospital's duty to its pa-
tients within the foregoing quotation. In fact, while res ipsa loquitur
has not been applied to a corporate negligence case in California, it has
been used in cases involving hospitals in traditional medical malprac-
tice cases such as those based upon nursing staff negligence. 7' More
importantly, it has been used in hospital malpractice cases to assist
plaintiffs in proving that hospitals breached their traditional duty to
protect patients from harm.' 7'
In California, it is ordinarily a question of fact whether particular
circumstances justify application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 172
The doctrine, therefore, will be available for use in a corporate negli-
gence case, if a plaintiff can show that the basic res #psa loquitur condi-
tions have been met.
167. CAL. EVID. CODE §646.
168. Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d at 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
169. Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal. 3d 780, 788-89, 478 P.2d 480, 485, 91 Cal. Rptr. 760, 765
(1970) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
170. See, e.g., Cline v. Lund, 31 Cal. App. 3d 755, 107 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1973); Sanchez v. Bay
General Hosp., 116 Cal. App. 3d 776, 172 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981); Annot., Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Action against Hospitalfor Injury to Patient, 3 A.L.R.3d 1315 (1966). For a discussion of res ipsa
loquitur in medical malpractice, see Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitur- Its Place in Medical Maiprac-
lice Litigation, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 343 (1973).
171. See, e.g., Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp., 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577
(1967); Meier v. Ross General Hosp., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968);
GinNon Louie v. Chinese Hosp. Association, 249 Cal. App. 2d 774, 57 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1967). The
"three traditional corporate or institutional duties" of hospitals have been summarized as mainte-
nance of building and grounds, maintenance of equipment and selection and supervision of em-
ployees. See A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION 399-
409.
172. See, e.g., Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal. 3d 351, 360, 540 P.2d 33, 39, 124 Cal. Rptr. 193,
199-200 (1975).
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The conditions for its application are established by the "Ybarra-
Newing formulation."' 73 They are as follows:
* . . (1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the plaintiff.'74
Most patients will have little difficulty proving the second and third
conditions of the Ybarra-Newing formulation. Proving the first condi-
tion, that is, that the injury is of a type which ordinarily does not hap-
pen unless someone is negligent, will be more difficult. It will probably
require expert testimony.'75 In hospital corporate negligence, the in-
jury to the patient is not what the physician does or fails to do to the
patient, that is, the professional malpractice. Rather, the negligence is
the fact that an incompetent physician was allowed to, and did treat,
the patient. 1
76
In summary, it is possible that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may
be applied in corporate negligence cases in California, thereby placing
the burden of explanation on hospitals to show that their medical staff
committees were not negligent in the performance of their peer review
activities. 177  The protection from discovery provided by Evidence
Code section 1157 may play a large part in the resolution of this ques-
tion, since if the burden of explanation is not shifted to "those who
wield the instruments of injury and whose due care is vital to life it-
self,"'178 the plaintiff may not be able to obtain evidence to prove his
case.
4. Do Caifornia Evidence Code Sections 1156 or 1157 Prohibit a
Hospitalfrom Introducing Medical Staff Committee
Records in Its Own Defense?
The use of medical staff peer review records by a hospital in its own
173. Sanchez v. Bay General Hosp., 116 Cal. App. 3d at 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The term
"Ybarra-Newing formulation" refers to the cases of Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d
687 (1944), and Newing v. Cheatham.
174. Id at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
175. See, e.g., 15 Cal. 3d at 359-60, 540 P.2d at 39, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 199. In medical malprac-
tice cases, expert testimony is required if the medical procedure at issue is special, unusual, com-
plex or otherwise beyond a layperson's common knowledge. See B. WITKIN, CAL. EVIDENCE 69-
71 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)
176. Some of the consolidated cases entitled Katie Cichy v. William Miofsky, M.D., set for trial
in early 1983 in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, include causes of action in which the
plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to recover damages from the hospital solely because they
were patients in operating rooms in which Miofsky was permitted to practice anesthesiology.
They claim damages not from any malpractice Miofsky may have committed against them, but
only arising out of the fact that he attended them as an anesthesiologist.
177. Cf. Montes v. Hartford Hosp., 16 Conn. Supp. 441, 226 A.2d 798 (1966); Richards v.
Grace-New Haven Community Hosp., 137 Conn. 508, 79 A.2d 353 (1951).
178. Bardessono v. Michels, 3 Cal. 3d at 789, 478 P.2d at 485, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
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defense may be important to rebut aprimafacie case of corporate neg-
ligence or if res ipsa loquitur is used to shift the burden of producing
evidence to the hospital. The ability of a hospital to use such records is
not without question. Evidence Code section 1157, does not expressly
affect the admissibility of medical staff committee records; it merely
protects them from discovery. The specific question of their admissibil-
ity has thus far escaped judicial decision.
If Section 1157 does not prevent the admissibility of committee
records and if they are not otherwise rendered inadmissible by the
hearsay rule or any other rule of evidence, they could be used by the
hospital in its defense.1 79 If so, the hospital has an obvious advantage,
since it would not have to produce the records before trial. It is un-
likely that the courts would endorse such an unfair practice. More
likely, the court would order a hospital to disclose to the plaintiff all
records the hospital intended to use at trial, in effect, forcing the hospi-
tal to waive Evidence Code section 1157 protection as a condition to
being permitted to introduce medical staff records at trial.
80
If, on the other hand, the committee records are inadmissible as well
as undiscoverable, they will not be available to help or hurt either party
at trial. The party with the burden of producing evidence obviously
will be in a difficult position.
The admissibility question is further clouded by the relationship be-
tween sections 1156 and 1157 of the Evidence Code. Section 1156 al-
lows discovery of the records of medical staff committees which engage
in research and medical or dental study for the purpose of reducing
morbidity and mortality, but it expressly makes those records inadmis-
179. In November of 1982, the California Hospital Association issued a bulletin to its mem-
bers urging them to resist "the temptation" to waive section 1157 protection for committee records
and to continue to assert the position that sections 1156 and 1157 prohibit the discovery or admis-
sibility of committee records, either offensively or defensively.
180. Almost all of the states, in addition to California, that recognize the theory of corporate
negligence have some type of evidentiary privilege exempting medical staff committee records
from discovery. Arizona's statute is particularly interesting. As described and applied by the
Arizona Supreme Court in Tuscon Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958, it
permits the statements and information considered by a committee to be subpoenaed, while pro-
tecting from discovery the reports and minutes of the committee. It distinguishes between purely
factual, investigative matters and materials that are the product of reflective deliberation or pol-
icy-making processes. It allows candid and conscientious evaluations to be protected, but it also
allows for the discovery of factual matters that form the basis of the committee's decision.
The Arizona solution seems to be a fair compromise for plaintiffs and hospitals alike. It permits
a court to review the process while protecting the discussions of the participants. It is also a
solution which medical staff members might accept since it protects their deliberations from dis-
closure. A California court might arrive at such a solution simply by interpreting section 1157 in
such a way as to find that the factual investigative materials were neither the proceedings nor the
records of a medical staff committee. Stranger things have happened. Alternatively, it may be
time to amend sections 1156 and 1157 to resolve some of the conflicts and ambiguities which
presently exist. The risks of the legislative process cannot be any greater than the risks of the
judicial process.
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sible as evidence in any action or before any administrative body,
agency, or person.18t The provisions of sections 1156 and 1157 are ap-
parently in conffict since the committees researching morbidity and
mortality (section 1156 committees) are also committees having the re-
sponsibility for evaluation and improvement of the quality of care ren-
dered in a hospital (section 1157 committees). The questions are
whether section 1157 supersedes or controls section 1156, making all
records undiscoverable, and whether section 1156 makes all records in-
admissible.
Section 1156 was enacted in 1965 and became operative on January
1, 1967. As noted above, section 1157 was enacted in 1968, apparently
in response to the decision in Kenney v. Superior Court"8 2 which per-
mitted a malpractice plaintiff to discover hospital medical staff records
which might reveal information bearing on the competency of the de-
fendant doctor.' The Kenney court remarked that the committee
records might be useful to the plaintiff even if they were inadmissible,
since they might point the way to admissible evidence. 84 Their admis-
sibility will be determined by regular evidentiary rules. Consequently,
the focus of section 1157 on discoverability may well be a result of the
legislature's decision to reverse the narrow holding in Kenney.
If Evidence Code section 1157 does not prohibit the admissibility of
committee records, then the records are subject to being subpoenaed
and used at trial. The protection provided by section 1157, therefore, is
limited. It protects the records from discovery, thereby preventing a
plaintiff from using the information in the preparation of his or her
131. Section 1156 provides as follows:
(a) In-hospital medical or medical-dental staff committees of a licensed hospital may
engage in research and medical or dental study for the purpose of reducing morbid-
ity or mortality, and may make findings and recommendations relating to such pur-
pose. Except as provided in subdivision (b), the written records of interviews,
reports, statements, or memoranda of such in-hospital medical or medical-dental
staff committees relating to such medical or dental studies are subject to Sections
2015 and 2036, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure (relating to discovery pro-
ceedings) but, subject to subdivisions (c) and (d), shall not be admitted as evidence
in any action or before any administrative body, agency, or person.
(b) The disclosure, with or without the consent of the patient, of information concern-
ing him to such in-hospital medical or medical-dental staff committee does not
make unprivileged any information that would otherwise be privileged under Sec-
tion 994 or 1014; but, notwithstanding Sections 994 and 1014, such information is
subject to discovery under subdivision (a) except that the identity of the patient
may not be discovered under subdivision (a) unless the patient consents to such
disclosure.
(c) This section does not affect the admissibility in evidence of the original medical or
dental records of any patient.
(d) This section does not exclude evidence which is relevant evidence in criminal
action.
182. 255 Cal. App. 2d 106, 63 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1967).
183. Id at 108-09, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 86-87.
184. Id at 109, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
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case, but it does not, at least on its face, protect the records from being
used at trial. The confidentiality of records protected by section 1157,
therefore, may be somewhat illusory.
By contrast, section 1156 expressly declares that the records of mor-
bidity and mortality committees are inadmissible. Neither the hospital
nor a malpractice plaintiff can introduce such records over an objec-
tion. It may be argued that sections 1156 and 1157 should be read to-
gether to make all peer review medical staff committee records
nondiscoverable and inadmissible.185 This argument is based generally
on the idea that the difference in language between section 1156 and
section 1157 reflects a growing sophistication in the evolution of the
medical staff peer review process. The committees described in section
1156, according to the argument, are really the same committees that
are described in section 1157, that is, committees engaged in research
and study for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality are
equivalent to committees having the responsibility of evaluation and
improvement of the quality of care rendered in the hospital. Section
1157 was enacted, the argument concludes, to complete the process be-
gun with section 1156, to close the discovery "loophole."
This argument might very well be right. If it is right, then medical
staff committee records are inadmissible and will not be available for
use by hospitals in defending Elam claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision by the Elam court to expand the duty of a hospital to its
patients to include the exercise of reasonable care in the selection and
retention of members of its medical staff came as no surprise to most
lawyers in the health care field. When, as they inevitably must, the
courts of this state address the "parties questions" and the "proof ques-
tions" raised in this article, their answers may prove to be surprising.
Whatever the answers, and regardless of whether they adopt the rea-
soning and analysis set forth above, their impact will alter the organiza-
tional structure of California hospitals in the 1980's and, perhaps,
beyond.
185. For example, the California Hospital Association apparently takes this position. See
supra note 189.
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